Doc. 8371
12 April 1999
Future political status of Kosovo
Information report
Political Affairs Committee
Rapporteurs: Mr András Bársony, Hungary, Socialist
Group and
Mr Peter Bloetzer, Switzerland, Group of the
European People’s Party
Link :
1. The present
report was established on 19 March 1999, as a follow-up to the
parliamentary colloquium on the future political status of Kosovo
organised on 12 March 1999 in Paris by the Political Affairs
Committee. Consequently, it does not take into account the
launching of the operation "Allied Force" against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, nor of its political and humanitarian
consequences. Nevertheless, the Committee decided, during its meeting
of 31 March 1999, to approve in as such this document, as an
information report, in order to inform members of the Assembly of
work in this domain.
2. On the eve,
the Standing Committee adopted
Resolution 1182 (1999) and
Recommendation 1400 (1999) on the crisis in Kosovo and the
situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, on the basis of a
text submitted by the Political Affairs Committee.
3. The Political
Affairs Committee will examine at its next meeting in Paris on 16
April 1999 a new report on the crisis in Kosovo and the situation in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which will be submitted during
the April 1999 part-session.
I.
Introduction
4. Since the
beginning of the crisis, the situation in Kosovo and in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia in general has been a subject of constant
concern for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and
its Political Affairs Committee. Six debates concerning the situation
in this country have been held since the beginning of 1998, the
latest one in January 1999.
5. In view of
the intensification of the violence and the radicalisation of both
camps, the international community, represented by the Contact Group,
decided to convoke the Yugoslav parties, including the Serbs and the
Albanians, to a round of negotiations held from 6 to 23 February 1999
in Rambouillet. After the elaboration of an interim agreement for
peace and self-government in Kosovo by the representatives of the
Contact Group, the parties met again in Paris on 15 March 1999.
6. This
Agreement in fact goes entirely in the sense of the recommendations
formulated by the Parliamentary Assembly concerning the political
solution of the conflict in Kosovo, as well as those made by other
international organisations. The rapporteurs consider that the
Parliamentary Assembly should be unanimous in calling for the
signature and application of this Agreement without delay. The
Albanian party having signed on 18 March 1999, it has become
essential to put pressure on the Yugoslav and Serbian parties to do
the same.
7. In this
context, a colloquium was organised on 12 March 1999 in Paris by the
Political Affairs Committee with a view to promoting dialogue between
different political forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) and, by this means, to encourage the acceptance of the interim
agreement, and help bring a peaceful solution to the Kosovo conflict.
8. In this
information report, the rapporteurs recall the positions adopted by
the Parliamentary Assembly on the different aspects of the Kosovo
conflict, present a summary of the interim agreement and of the
debates in the above-mentioned colloquium. They consider that these
elements are essential for the formulation of proposals to put to the
Assembly.
II. Position
of the Parliamentary Assembly on the crisis in Kosovo and the
situation in the FRY
1. Disarmament
9. The Assembly
called for an immediate cease-fire and the creation of conditions for
refugees and displaced persons to return and considered that
international observers should accede to all parts of Kosovo to
evaluate the situation and make an investigation of violations of
human rights [Rec. 1384 (1998)]. The Assembly considered that the
escalation in the violence was attributable in the first place to the
policy of President Milosevic [Rec. 1376 (1998)]. The Assembly
considered that security on the whole territory of Kosovo was a
pre-condition for the resumption of negotiations on the future
political status of Kosovo [Rec. 1376 (1998)]. The Assembly also
invited the FRY authorities to reduce its military presence to the
minimum necessary for keeping public order and controlling its
borders [Rec. 1376 (1998)].
2. Massacres
10. The Assembly
firmly condemned the massacre of Racak and asked for those
responsible of this crime to be prosecuted [Rec. 1397 (1999)]. The
Assembly asked for an independent investigation to be carry out of
the events in the Drenica region [Rec. 1360 (1998)].
3. Refugees and displaced persons
11. The Assembly
considered that priority must be given to the protection and
assistance to refugees and displaced persons, supported the efforts
made by the UNHCR and the ICRC and invited the member states to
collect funds [Rec. 1397 (1999)]. The Assembly also recommended to
the member states not to expel asylum seekers from the region [Rec.
1397 (1999)]. The Assembly considered that the Yugoslav and Serbian
authorities must create the conditions for the return of refugees and
displaced persons to their homes [Rec. 1385 (1999)]. It also
underlined that a humanitarian aid should not be a substitute for a
political solution [Rec. 1385 (1999)].
4. Acts of terrorism
12. The Assembly
firmly condemned acts of terrorism committed by the UCK and other
armed groups and invited the Albanian political forces in Kosovo to
make pressure on the UCK to conform itself to international demands
[Rec. 1397 (1999)]. The Assembly considered that those committing
acts of terrorism should also be held responsible for the
deterioration of the situation and of the blow to a peaceful solution
of the conflict [Rec. 1376 (1998)].
5. Smuggling of arms
13. The Assembly
recommended the deployment of international forces on the border
between the FRY and Albania [Rec. 1397 (1999)].
6. International obligations
14. The Assembly
asked the Yugoslav authorities to respect the resolutions of the
United Nations Security Council, the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement,
as well as the agreements concluded between Yugoslavia and OSCE and
NATO, otherwise the international organisations should take all
measures necessary to ensure respect of these obligations [Rec. 1397
(1999)]. The Assembly considered that a positive attitude from the
Yugoslav authorities would pave the way to the integration of the FRY
within the international community [Rec. 1376 (1998)].
7. OSCE Kosovo verification mission
15. The Assembly
asked the Yugoslav authorities and the Kosovar political forces to
fully co-operate with this body [Rec. 1397 (1999)].
8. International Criminal Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)
16. The Assembly
asked the Yugoslav authorities to stop obstructing the works of the
tribunal, asked for the persons responsible for crimes to be
delivered to the tribunal [Rec. 1397 (1999)]. The Assembly recalled
that the ICTY has the competence to investigate allegations of crimes
against humanity committed in Kosovo [Rec. 1397 (1999)].
9. The Assembly’s political dialogue with the
Yugoslav authorities
17. The Assembly
considered that the Yugoslav authorities did not respect any of the
Council of Europe’s principles and that maintaining this dialogue
will depend on the respect of the Council of Europe’s
recommendations by these authorities [Rec. 1397 (1999)]. The Assembly
took act of the request for membership to the Council of Europe
presented by the Yugoslav government on 18 March 1998, but stated
that this request could be taken into consideration at the condition
that the FRY respects the principles and the values of the Council of
Europe [Rec. 1368 (1998)]. In its Rec. 1397 (1999), the Assembly
recommended to the Committee of Ministers to envisage to send back
the request for membership if the Yugoslav authorities continue not
to respect their international obligations.
10. Political dialogue with the democratic
opposition
18. The Assembly
decided to pursue dialogue with democratic political forces and
representatives of the civil society, attached to a peaceful
settlement of the Kosovo crisis and to the democratic reforms within
the FRY [Rec. 1397 (1999)].
11. Future political status of Kosovo
19. The Assembly
requested both parties to begin negotiations [Rec. 1397 (1999)]. The
Assembly considers that the political status of Kosovo must respect
the territorial integrity of the FRY and be based on a substantial
degree of autonomy, comprising an enhanced autonomy in the
legislative, executive, judicial, public order, economic, educative
and cultural fields, respect for rights of Serbs and other minorities
and direct representation of Kosovo at the federal level [Rec. 1384
(1998)]. The Assembly is in favour of international guarantees
preventing from return to the status quo or secession [Rec. 1384
(1998)]. The Assembly reiterated several times its proposal for help
in the contacts between the Yugoslav authorities and the
representatives of the Kosovo Albanians.
12. Democratic reforms within the FRY
20. The Assembly
expressed concern regarding deterioration of the situation of human
rights in Serbia, and particularly restrictions to freedom of
expression imposed by the Serbian law on public information and the
Serbian law on the universities [Rec. 1397 (1999)]. The Assembly
considered that no long-lasting solution for Kosovo be possible in
the absence of democratic reforms within the FRY [Rec. 1384 (1998)].
The Assembly welcomed the electoral victory of the reform parties in
Montenegro and invited President Milosevic to engage a political
dialogue with the new Montenegrin leaders [Rec. 1376 (1998)]. The
Assembly encouraged the authorities to commit themselves to implement
a reform programme according to the recommendations presented by
Felipe Gonzalez in 1996 [Rec. 1376 (1998)]. The Assembly expressed
concerns about the growing influence of the extremist parties within
the FRY [Rec. 1368 (1998)].
III. Interim
agreement for peace and self-government in Kosovo
21. An interim
agreement for peace and self-government for Kosovo has been reached
by the negotiations held in Rambouillet from 6 to 23 February
1999. It is based on the ten points which the Contact Group had
agreed upon at its meeting in London on 29 January 1999. The parties
to this agreement (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republic of Serbia
and Kosovo) shall sign it when the negotiations will resume in France
on 15 March 1999 under the auspices of the Contact Group and the
European Union. On 15 March 1999, the Kosovo delegation declared its
intention to sign the text. This signing took place on 18 March 1999.
1. The
international community and Kosovo
22. The
provisions of the Agreement are divided into eight chapters
(constitution, police and public civil security, conduct and
supervision of the elections, economic issues, implementation I,
ombudsman, implementation II, final clauses). The provisions which do
not fit into these categories have been regrouped into a part at the
beginning of the Agreement entitled "framework". This part
numerates a series of confidence-building measures which shall be
applied as soon as the Agreement is signed.
23. The police
and civil public security (Chapter 2) are the responsibility of the
Implementation Mission of the OSCE. The head of the Mission will be
able to take binding directives to parties in the fields of police
and civil security. The liberty of movement is guaranteed on the
whole territory of Kosovo. Communal police units shall be organised.
An administration for penal justice, an interim police academy, a
commission for criminal justice will be created. Until its programmed
withdrawal, the Ministry of Interior Police shall continue to assume
the functions of civil police. The government of FRY shall continue
to assume the border control. Any person arrested in Kosovo shall be
brought to the jurisdiction of a Court in Kosovo.
24. Elections
(Chapter 3) will be held in the nine months following the entry into
force of the agreement and will be supervised by the OSCE. A list of
voters will be established by a Central Election Commission
established by the OSCE. The federal authorities shall organise a
population census of Kosovo under the supervision of the OSCE and
with the participation of the authorities of Kosovo as soon as the
OSCE decide that the conditions have been met.
25. The
agreement also contains provisions concerning economic issues
(Chapter 4). The European Commission is in charge of organising a
conference of donors during the month following the entry into force
of the agreement. The international community will take care of the
emergency humanitarian and economic assistance.
26. The
agreement provides for the implementation of a civil volet (Chapter
5). The OSCE will establish, in cooperation with the European Union,
an Implementation Mission in Kosovo. The responsibilities and powers
of the KVM and its chief will be transferred to the Implementation
Mission and its chief. A Joint Commission will be created. It will be
the central mechanism in charge of the monitoring and the
coordination of the implementation of the civil volet. It will be
composed of the chief of the Mission, a representative of the
Federation, a representative of Serbia, a representative of each
national community, a representative of the President of the Assembly
of Kosovo and a representative of the President of Kosovo. The chief
of the Implementation Mission will also be the President of the Joint
Commission. The Joint Commission will operate on the basis of
consensus, but if a consensus cannot be reached, the President of the
Joint Commission will take the decision. The chief of the Mission
will be able to establish a Joint Council of Kosovo, composed of
representatives of national communities, and local councils, composed
of representatives of national communities of the locality where the
council has been established. The chief of the Mission will supervise
and direct the civil aspects of the agreement. The laws and
regulations will remain in force until they are changed ; those
incompatible with the agreement will be void. Martial law will be
abolished. The institutions will remain in power until they are
replaced by the organs established in the application of this
agreement. The chief of the Mission will take the necessary measures
to the development and functioning of independent media.
27. The
agreement provides for the implementation of a military volet
(Chapter 7). The Security Council shall give its backing to the
creation of a military force which will be sent to the region to help
to implement the agreement. NATO will establish and deploy this force
(KFOR) composed of units of NATO and non-member countries, and placed
under the direction and political control of the Atlantic Council.
Other countries will be able to participate in the implementation of
the agreement, subject to an agreement between those states and NATO.
Detailed provisions will govern : the cessation of hostilities,
the redeployment, the withdrawal and the demilitarisation of military
forces (Yugoslav Army forces, Ministry of Interior Police forces and
other forces), notifications, operations and authority of the KFOR,
border control, control of air movements, Joint Military Commission,
the release of prisoners, the co-operation with other entities
implied in the implementation of the agreement. The date of
activation of the KFOR will be decided by the NATO.
2. The
sharing of responsibilities between the FRY, Serbia and Kosovo
28. The sharing
of responsibilities between the FRY, the Republic of Serbia and
Kosovo appears in the Agreement. It was not possible to base this
sharing on the Yugoslav constitutional order, in view of the
imprecision of the Constitution of the FRY in this respect, and the
lack of confidence of the Kosovo Albanians in the impartiality of the
organs of the FRY responsible for interpreting the Constitution. The
responsibilities of the FRY appear to be limited to the maintenance
of a common market, defence, foreign affairs and monetary policy. The
Yugoslav legislation will continue to play an important role in
Kosovo so long as the laws and regulations at present in force have
not been replaced by decisions emanating from the competent bodies.
The responsibilities of the Republic of Serbia are limited to the
organisation of the elections at Republic level and the provision of
public services to the persons concerned. Formally, Kosovo continues
to be part of the Republic of Serbia.
3. The internal
structures of Kosovo
29. A draft
constitution is included in the agreement (Chapter 1). Kosovo is
endowed with proper legislative, executive and judiciary organs. The
Constitution enumerates competences which come under the Federation,
the Republic of Serbia, Kosovo and the communes, which are the local
territorial units. The different national communities, including
those of relatively lower importance, are guaranteed a representation
within the organs of the State and the administration ; they
have their own representative institutions. The persons subject to
prosecutions and indictments by the ICTY cannot hold any office. The
Assembly is comprised of 120 members elected for a term of three
years. The President of the Assembly can not have the same
nationality as the President of Kosovo. The President of Kosovo is
elected for a three years term by the Assembly. The government is
composed of a Prime Minister and ministers, including at least one
representative of each national community. A function of chief
prosecutor is established. Kosovo is endowed with a Constitutional
Court, a Supreme Court, district and municipal tribunals. The
citizens of Kosovo enjoy the rights and freedoms enshrined in the
European Convention for Human Rights. They elect 10 deputies to the
Citizens’ Chamber of the Federation, and 20 deputies to the
Assembly of Serbia. Kosovo shall have representatives within the
federal government, Serbia’s government, the federal Constitutional
Court, the federal Court and the Supreme Court of Serbia, which will
be chosen by these authorities. The Assembly will be able to amend
the Constitution by a two thirds majority.
30. An ombudsman
(Chapter 6) will be named, nominated by the President and elected by
the Assembly of Kosovo for a non renewable three year term from a
list of candidates proposed by the President of the European Court of
Human Rights. He will neither be able to have the nationality of a
successor State of the former Yugoslavia, nor of a neighbouring
country.
4. The final
settlement
31. The
agreement submitted to the parties should be adopted without
modifications, it will not be able to be modified before its
signature. Once it has been signed, the agreement can be modified if
proposed changes receive the approval of all parties (but the
amendments to the Constitution will be subject to a particular
procedure). Three years after the entry into force of this text, an
international conference shall meet to determine a mechanism for
final settlement for Kosovo, on the basis of the wishes of the people
and the openion of the relevant authorities.
32. The interim
agreement for peace and self-government in Kosovo concretises the
idea of an international protectorate for Kosovo. It would appear
difficult to predict, at present, whether a massive international
presence, although contributing to the pacification of the region,
will be capable of bringing democracy to the FRY (reference may be
made in this regard to the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose
progress along the path of democracy is laborious to say the least).
IV. Summary
of the debates of the parliamentary colloquium on the future
political status of Kosovo (Paris, 12 March 1999)
1. Introduction
33. The debates
of this colloquium concerned the proposals made by the Contact Group
and taken up in the Agreement for peace and self-government in
Kosovo. Its aim was to encourage the parties concerned to accept
these proposals and to promote dialogue between different political
forces of the FRY with a view to establishing the democratic
stabilisation of this country.
34. A little
over a dozen political parties from the FRY were represented at this
colloquium, and were able to express their views. The international
community was represented by the European Union negotiator at the
Rambouillet Meeting, Mr Petritsch, ambassadors of the Contact
Group member countries, a representative of the OSCE, a
representative of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
and a Representative of the Congress of Local and Regional
Authorities of Europe.
2. The Contact Group's proposals
35. The Contact
Group's proposals were at the centre of the discussions at the
colloquium. Mr Petritsch came to present the Rambouillet
Agreement whose main points appear in Part III of this report.
Mr Petritsch encouraged the signature of the Agreement by the
Serbian and Kosovar representatives. The OSCE representative did
likewise. Throughout the colloquium the words “dialogue” and
“compromise” kept returning as a leitmotiv.
36. Dialogue
should permit the parties to overcome the difficulties resulting from
the Tito heritage. These difficulties may be identified as:
definition of the status of the Republics and the autonomous
Republics, definition of the status of the peoples constituting the
RSFY, absence of a democratic culture, economic difficulties.
37. A compromise
has to be found between all the communities wishing to live in the
FRY. The integrity and sovereignty of the FRY being left intact by
the Rambouillet Agreement, a feeling of common belonging should
exist, and to achieve this there must be no discrimination of any
kind between the ethnic groups of Yugoslav society.
38. The Serbian
representatives at the colloquium were of the opinion that Serbia, in
acceptant the peace plan proposed by the Contact Group, would concede
to the Kosovo Albanians a greater degree of autonomy than the 1974
Constitution. They also stressed the fact that the final version of
the interim agreement was not drafted in consultation with the
Serbian delegation and should therefore be the subject of
negotiation.
39. The Albanian
side stressed the point that the interim agreement did not prejudice
a final settlement. The Albanians wanted the control of the Kosovo
economy to be in the hands of the autonomous government, while the
Serbs called for support for a democratic economy in Kosovo and
Metohija.
40. The
rapporteurs consider that an international military presence on the
ground is essential to ensure the effective implementation of the
Agreement. However, the Serbian representatives reiterated Belgrade's
refusal to accept foreign armed forces on their territory. Several
participants, both government and opposition, sought to demonstrate
that military intervention in the FRY would be a fundamental error,
because it would destroy the possibility of democratic reforms. There
would be reason to fear a military putsch in the FRY.
41. Russia's
point of view was that there should be an agreement between all the
parties, that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the FRY
must be preserved, that the self-government must take account of the
interests of the national communities (and notably the Serbs), and
that the protection of human rights and the rights of minorities must
be protected. According to Moscow, Belgrade's agreement was essential
for the deployment of foreign troops.
42. A question
was raised regarding the legal nature of the interim agreement.
According to one proposal, this treaty should be registered with the
Secretary General of the United Nations, in accordance with the
United Nations Charter. In the opinion of many, the ombudsman
approach envisaged by the Agreement was not appropriate in the Kosovo
context. Other points of disagreement concerned the threshold for the
representation of national communities (fixed at 0.5%) and the
methods used for counting the population.
43. An important
role was entrusted to the OSCE for the implementation of the
Agreement. The OSCE is shortly to hold a conference in Oslo on the
implementation of the Agreement to examine the coordination between
the international organisations and thus avoid duplication.
3. Democratic reforms within the FRY
44. The
democratisation of the FRY will not be easy. The Serbian participants
acknowledged the need to educate the people to democracy. According
to them it was also necessary to abolish the sanctions imposed on the
FRY and put an end to its diplomatic isolation by accepting it into
the international institutions.
45. According to
the participants, the Council of Europe could contribute to the
democratisation of the FRY in three fields: institutions, the respect
of human rights and local self-government. Similarly, the Council of
Europe could offer its expertise and its instruments in the field of
the protection of the rights of minorities. A redistribution of
competences between the minorities was in fact essential. A
multiethnic and democratic Serbia was the only one possible. A
process of political and economic democratisation should begin
immediately.
4. The status of the other regions and minorities
46. The
Montenegrin participants said Montenegro did not participate in the
Rambouillet negotiations and was not represented in Paris either.
There was no doubt however that the talks concerned it too, as a
member of the Yugoslav Federation. The attribution of republic status
to Kosovo would have an impact on relations between Serbia and
Montenegro, which risked finding itself marginalised or simply
attached to Serbia. The two republics were in a situation that was
not equitable, and it was Montenegro that suffered most from the
sanctions imposed on the FRY.
47. According to
the participants from Vojvodina, Vojvodina should return to the
autonomous status it enjoyed under the 1974 Constitution. The main
political forces of the region would be favourable to republic status
for Vojvodina if Kosovo was given republic status. Vojvodina was
inhabited by a majority of Serbs (60%), but had many minorities
(Hungarian, Croat, Romanian, Slovak, Ruthenian), to the extent that
this region had been called a miniature Yugoslavia within Yugoslavia
itself. All these minorities should be accorded the same rights.
48. The
representatives of Sandjak expressed their concern about the
discrimination to which they were subject, and which they qualified
as “ethnic cleansing”. The autonomous status of the municipality
of Novi Pazar (capital of Sandjak) had been abolished, and the fate
of the Sandjak Bosnians had not been settled by the Rambouillet
Agreement.
49. Several
Yugoslav parties represented at the colloquium invoked the 1974
Constitution to justify their claims or to refute those of others. As
one participant pointed out however, this constitution was now
obsolete, and furthermore it was anti-democratic.
V.
Conclusions
50. The aim of
the Rambouillet process is clear: to avoid any further bloodshed and
to pacify a region that has become a hotbed of violence in Europe. As
the Kosovo Albanians signed the interim agreement on 18 March 1999,
the responsibility for peace now lies with the Serbian party.
51. The Council
of Europe must support the acceptance and implementation of this
Agreement by all the parties. However, it may be regretted that the
Council of Europe is not mentioned anywhere in the Agreement. The
implementation of the Agreement will be possible only with
international aid, not in isolation. The Council of Europe, with all
its experience, has particular competence in several of the fields
cited in the Agreement, especially as regards the respect of human
rights, the establishment of institutions, democratic self-government
and cooperation with other international organisations.
52. The
Parliamentary Assembly has always maintained that a lasting solution
in Kosovo will not be possible without democratic reforms throughout
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The pluralist democratic system,
the respect of human rights and the rule of law are the pillars on
which the future of the peoples in this country must rest, whatever
the institutional solution chosen. If there is a real will to apply
these principles, the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary
Assembly should be ready to offer their assistance so that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia can become once more a fully accepted
member of the European family.
*
* *
Reporting committee : Political Affairs Committee
Reference to committee : Ref. 2154, 2158, 2251,
2303 et 2355
Budgetary implications for the Assembly : none
Draft information report approved by the committee
on 31 March 1999
Members of the Committee : Mr Ruffy
(Chairman), Mrs Ojuland (Vice-Chairperson), Mr Toshev
(Vice-Chairman), MM Arzilli (alternate: Mr Andreoli),
Atkinson, Bársony, Behrendt, Bergqvist, Björck,
Blaauw (alternate: Mrs Gelderbolm-Lankhout), MM Bloetzer,
Bühler, Daly, Davis, Demetriou, Dokle, Domljan,
Fico, Dreyfus-Schmidt, Fico, Gjellerod, Gligoroski,
Glotov, Gül, Mrs Iotti (alternate: Mr Evangelisti), Mr
Iwinski, Mrs Kautto, MM Kirilov, Krzaklewski,
Kuzmickas, Mrs Lentz-Cornette (alternate: Mr Kollwelter), MM
Lopez Henares, Lupu, van der Maelen (alternate: Mr Nothomb)
Maginas, Martinez, Medeiros Ferreira, Meier (alternate:
Mrs Wohlwend), MM Micheloyiannis, Mota Amaral (alternate:
Mr Roseta), Mutman, Nallet (alternate: Baumel,
Vice-Président), Nedelciuc, Mme Nemkova, MM Neuwirth
(alternate: Mr Lemoine), Oliynyk, Pahor,
Palmitjavila Ribo, Prusak, Mme Ragnarsdottir, MM
Schieder, Schwimmer, Schlotten, Selva (alternate: Mr
Turini), Sinka, Mme Smith, Mme Stanoiu, Mme Stepová,
MM Surjan, Thoresen, Timmermans, Urbain (alternate: Mr
Beaufays), Vella, Volcic, Zhebrovsky.
N.B. The names of the members who took part in the
vote are printed in italics
Secretaries of the committee: Mr Kleijssen, Mr Sich,
Mrs Ruotanen
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